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ast, horrific disasters marked the 20th century, but
also widespread, beneficent progress. In the first
half, two world wars almost ended Western 
civilization. In the second half, democracy spread and living
standards rose. Throughout, monetary instability inter-
acted with social upheaval and political disorder. Inflation
and deflation created feelings of powerlessness in the face
of impersonal forces that promoted a search for scape-
goats. Hyperinflation and depression contributed to the
rise of Nazism in Germany. The stability of the
deutschemark then accompanied the German postwar
growth miracle.
In the United States, deflation and
depression in the 1930s produced a
decade of untold human misery. The 
Great Inflation of the 1970s spawned
wage and price controls, which trampled
on due process. The feeling of govern-
ment’s loss of control, symbolized by gas
lines, helped propel Ronald Reagan into
power. After Paul Volcker led the Fed to
accept responsibility for inflation in
1979, an increase in monetary stability
accompanied an increase in economic
stability. 
The success of the 21st century will
depend upon how well societies learn
the lessons of the 20th century. The
grand monetary experiment of the last
century was replacement of a gold stan-
dard with a fiat money standard. The
failure of central banks to understand
their new responsibility to provide a
nominal anchor for prices lay at the heart of the spectacular
monetary failures of that century. What nominal anchor and
what monetary standard are in place at the start of the cur-
rent century?
The Volcker-Greenspan Monetary Standard
The U.S. monetary standard has evolved pragmatically
rather than by conscious design. The current standard arose
out of the consistent effort by the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) under Paul Volcker and Alan
Greenspan to re-anchor inflationary expectations
unmoored by the experience with stop-go policy.
Consistency under duress achieved credibility. Credibility
laid the foundation for the current nominal anchor: an
expectation of low, stable trend inflation unaffected by
macroeconomic shocks.
Something must “anchor” the public’s expectation of the
future value of money. For the gold standard, it was the 
commitment to maintain the par value of gold. Under the
gold standard as it existed in the late 19th-century, money
received its value from the Bank of England’s commitment
to maintain in the future a fixed pound price of an ounce of
gold. For the contemporaneous money price of gold to be
viable, the public had to believe that the Bank would main-
tain that value in the future.
To achieve the stability in the expected future price level
requisite for contemporaneous stability of the price level,
the public must believe that the central
bank will behave consistently. Over the
quarter century of the Volcker-
Greenspan era, the Fed did not follow
a rule in the sense that it never depart-
ed from consistent procedures for
setting the funds rate. Nevertheless,
the achievement of near price stability
derived from an overall consistency of
behavior that emerged out of an effort
to restore the expectational stability of
the earlier commodity standard.
Stop-Go Monetary Policy and
the Loss of a Nominal Anchor
Experience with a commodity standard
created an expectation of price stability
that persisted into the second half of the
20th century. The primacy attached to
price stability by the early William
McChesney Martin FOMC sustained
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     that expectation into the 1960s. Subsequently, stop-go policy
opportunistically exploited it and, in time, destroyed the
nominal anchor provided by the expectation of price stability. 
Keynesians emphasized discretionary manipulation of
aggregate demand. Because they assumed the existence of
an inertia in inflation independent of monetary policy, they
believed that subject to the inflation-unemployment trade-
offs of the Phillips curve, the central bank could manipulate
aggregate nominal demand to smooth fluctuations in real
output. The exercise of discretion destroyed the prior 
nominal expectational stability. 
Sherman Maisel, a member of the Board of Governors
from 1965 until 1972, expressed the Keynesian view in 1973:
There is a trade-off between idle men and a more stable
value for the dollar. Aconscious decision must be made as to
how much unemployment and loss of output is acceptable in
order to get smaller price rises. Some price increases origi-
nate on the cost side or in particular industries. These cannot
be halted by monetary policy, which acts principally on the 
overall aggregate demand for goods and services.…[E]xperi-
ence…shows that without some
type of government intervention in
the price-wage bargains struck by
labor and industry, the trade-off
between inflation and unemploy-
ment is unsatisfactory.
Starting with the Kennedy and
Johnson appointments to the
Board of Governors, Keynesian
views became increasingly preva-
lent within the FOMC. According
to these views, monetary policy
should aim for full employment,
almost universally assumed to
occur at a 4 percent unemploy-
ment rate or less. This figure benchmarked potential output.
By 1970, elimination of the resulting presumed negative out-
put gap (actual minus potential output) became a national
and an FOMC objective. Furthermore, a nonmonetary view
of inflation led the FOMC to believe that monetary policy
could be stimulative without increasing inflation as long as
the output gap was negative. The inflation that did occur
with unemployment in excess of 4 percent had to arise from
cost-push inflation. Failure to accommodate such inflation
would require high unemployment.
The loss of expectational stability began in 1966 when
the FOMC, unlike 1957, did not move in a sustained way to
eliminate nascent inflation. Bond yields began a long, irreg-
ular climb to the low double-digit figures reached in the
early 1980s. They fell briefly during the 1970 recession but
resumed rising in spring 1971. The Nixon administration
wanted rapid money supply growth to stimulate output suf-
ficiently to reduce the unemployment rate to 4.5 percent by
summer 1972. Arthur Burns, FOMC chairman, campaigned
for wage and price controls as the price of stimulative mon-
etary policy. In their absence, inflationary expectations,
Burns contended, would counter the stimulative effects of
expansionary policy. On Aug. 15, 1971, Nixon delivered the
controls Burns wanted and Burns obliged with expansionary
monetary policy.
Charles Walker, treasury undersecretary, later summa-
rized the forces leading the Nixon administration to adopt
wage and price controls:
[I]nflationary expectations…began to come back on us
last winter after we had them under some control. Interest
rates were going down, and then [they] shot back up
again.... [L]abor tended to leapfrog into the future and get
three-year contracts to guard against additional inflation.
Inflationary expectations are what really got us.
Keynesian aggregate demand management relied on iner-
tia in actual and expected inflation as the lever with which
increases in aggregate nominal demand lowered unemploy-
ment. By the end of the 1970s, that apparent inertia
disappeared. The public’s response
to price controls offered an early
example. Initially, their imposi-
tion did assuage inflationary fears
and permit stimulative monetary
policy. However, as George Shultz, 
treasury secretary in the Nixon
administration, wrote in 1978:
Once the suspicion of perma-
nence sets in, gamesmanship
develops between the private and
public sectors. It becomes apparent
that the controls process is 
not a one-way street in which the
government does something to the
private sector; rather, it is a two-way street, with the 
government taking an action, the private sector reacting to
it, the government reacting in turn, and so forth. It is a 
continual process of interplay and interrelations through
which those “controlled” develop ways of doing whatever
they really want to do.
Apart from wartime, before 1965, the United States had
never experienced sustained high inflation. Experience with
a commodity standard had conditioned the public to expect
stationarity in prices. However, the sustained rise in infla-
tion produced by stop-go monetary policy changed
expectations. As the public learned that policy did not pro-
vide for stationarity in either the price level or the inflation
rate, an increase in expected inflation increasingly offset the
stimulative effect of the expansionary policy followed in the
go phases of stop-go policy. By 1979, the Fed found itself
operating in the world described by Robert Barro and David
Gordon (in 1983) and Finn Kydland and Edward C. Prescott
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possesses an incentive to raise inflation to lower unemploy-
ment below its sustainable value. Forward-looking
expectations on the part of the public offset the stimulative
effect of monetary policy on the unemployment rate.
Herbert Stein, Council of Economic Advisers chairman
in the Nixon administration, foresaw in 1974 the environ-
ment that Volcker inherited upon becoming FOMC
chairman in 1979:
If policy or external events slow down the growth of
demand, price and wage increases abate little if at all, as every-
one is looking across the valley to the next surge of inflation.
Because price and wage increases persist at a high rate employ-
ment suffers, and governments are driven or tempted to prop
up demand, validating the expectation of continued or ever-
accelerating inflation.
In 1980, Paul Volcker observed:
[T]he idea of a sustainable “trade-off” between inflation
and prosperity… broke down as businessmen and individuals
learned to anticipate inflation, and to act in this anticipa-
tion.…The result is that orthodox monetary or fiscal
measures designed to stimulate could potentially be thwarted
by the self-protective instincts of financial and other markets.
Quite specifically, when financial markets jump to anticipate
inflationary consequences, and workers and businesses act on
the same assumption, there is room for grave doubt that the
traditional measures of purely demand stimulus can succeed in
their avowed purpose of enhancing real growth.
Alan Greenspan made the same point in congressional
testimony in 1993:
The effects of policy on the economy depend critically on
how market participants react to actions taken by the
Federal Reserve, as well as on expectations of our future
actions.…[T]he huge losses suffered by bondholders during
the 1970s and early 1980s sensitized them to the slightest
sign…of rising inflation. … An overly expansionary mone-
tary policy, or even its anticipation, is embedded fairly soon
in higher inflationary expectations and nominal bond yields.
Producers incorporate expected cost increases quickly into
their own prices, and eventually any increase in output 
disappears as inflation rises.
ANew Nominal Anchor
By summer 1979, the United States had lost the nominal
anchor provided by a residual expectation of inflation 
stationarity. The bond rate fluctuated widely at a level that
exceeded 10 percent until December 1985. The persistent
effort to change the inflationary expectations of the public,
unmoored in the prior period of stop-go monetary policy,
formed the crucible in which Volcker and Greenspan forged
a new monetary standard. At the time, the change to a 
preemptive policy of raising the funds rate in the absence of
rising inflation engendered fierce criticism. The abandon-
ment of aggregate-demand management in favor of
stabilizing inflationary expectations was a departure for
unknown shores.
Volcker and Greenspan had to reduce the expectation of
high inflation manifested in the high level of bond rates.
Furthermore, financial markets had come to associate infla-
tion shocks (relative price shocks that pass through to the
price level) and positive growth gaps (above-trend real out-
put growth) with increases in trend inflation. After the
initial disinflation that brought inflation down to 4 percent
in 1983, the FOMC still had to convince markets that a go
phase would not follow a stop phase. It had to forego expan-
sionary policy early during economic recovery when
inflation had fallen but unemployment had not yet returned
to full employment. The Volcker-Greenspan expected-infla-
tion/growth gap policy emerged in 1983 when the FOMC
raised the funds rate in response to rising bond rates despite
the existence of high unemployment and falling inflation.
Greenspan reconfirmed the policy during the “jobless recov-
ery” from the 1990 recession when the FOMC lowered the
funds rate only gradually to work down the inflationary
expectations embodied in long-term bond rates.
As a consequence of responding to the increases in bond
rates produced by positive growth gaps, the FOMC replaced
an output-gap target with a growth-gap indicator. It raised
the funds rate in response to sustained above-trend growth
rather than waiting until a perceived negative growth gap
approached zero and inflation rose. The more expeditious
movement in the funds rate eventually convinced markets
that the FOMC would keep real growth in line with poten-
tial growth promptly enough to prevent increases 
in inflation. As a result, in response to shocks, market 
participants began to move the forward real interest 
rates embodied in the yield curve continuously in a way
effectively estimated to return real output to potential. The
alternation of intervals of stimulative and restrictive mone-
tary policy disappeared. Ironically, allowing the price system
to work rather than attempting to improve upon it produced
more rather than less economic stability.  RF
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